Hearsay in Federal Administrative Adjudications: An Alternative Path to Reliability by Brenner, Roy D.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 27
Number 1 Summer/Fall 1996 Article 3
1996
Hearsay in Federal Administrative Adjudications:
An Alternative Path to Reliability
Roy D. Brenner
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brenner, Roy D. (1996) "Hearsay in Federal Administrative Adjudications: An Alternative Path to Reliability," University of Baltimore
Law Forum: Vol. 27 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol27/iss1/3
Articles 
HEARSAY IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS: 
AN AL TERNA TIVE PATH TO RELIABILITY 
by Roy D. Brenner 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The federal administrative law judge ("ALl") considering proffered hearsay evidence 
faces a difficult balancing test. Since hearsay can be 
both reliable and unreliable, I the ALl must weigh the 
inefficiency and confusion of admitting unreliable 
hearsay against the unfairness and possibility of 
reversal for excluding reliable hearsay. Unfortunately, 
no bright-line test for evaluating hearsay reliability 
exists.2 Current standards for reliability have been 
criticized as either too vague for fair application or too 
cumbersome for efficiency in the administrative 
process.3 
Federal ALls need a simple, functional standard 
to gauge hearsay reliability. The standard must 
provide a reasonably predictable result, as well as 
recognize the particular demands of administrative 
adjudications. 
This article first explores the fundamental ration-
ale for the hearsay rule and its application to current 
administrative practice. It then reviews the various 
standards now employed to determine admissibility of 
hearsay in formal administrative adjudications. 
Finally, the article proposes forming a simpler stan-
dard by synthesizing the foundational requirements of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence residual hearsay excep-
tions4 and case law tests of equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
'Kenneth C. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 689 (1964) ("[T]he reliability of hearsay ranges 
from the least to the most reliable."). 
2Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980). 
3See generally Davis, supra note I. 
4FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). 
II. BACKGROUND 
The underlying rationale for the hearsay rule and the administrative process is relevant to 
a discussion of how hearsay evidence might 'be han-
dled best in an administrative setting. The principal 
evidentiary dangers of admitting hearsay, while 
elementary, provide the primary lenses through which 
any theory of admission must be viewed. Since the 
goals and practices of administrative procedure are 
notably different from those found in ajudicial setting, 
an explication of the administrative process, as it 
relates to admission of hearsay evidence, supplies the 
focal limits of any such theory. Finally, the statutory 
and common-law mechanisms for establishing hearsay 
reliability add the analytical background from which 
an administrative picture of hearsay reliability may 
emerge. 
A. Hearsay Dangers 
Hearsay is commonly defined as an out-of-court 
statement offered as evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted by the declarant at the time the state-
ment was made.5 Admission of hearsay denies the 
opposing party the opportunity to test the truthfulness 
of the statement by cross-examination.6 
The inability to effectively cross-examine the 
declarant leaves unanswered questions as to the 
declarant's narration (and sincerity), perception and 
memory - the three traditional hearsay dangers. 7 The 
5CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246 
(John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); see also FED. R. EVID. 
801(c). 
65 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 
1362 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974). 
7MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 245. Dean McCormick considers 
lack of sincerity a defect in narration while acknowledging that 
27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 9 
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declarant may have been lying or may have been 
misunderstood by the testifying witness (narration).8 
The declarant may not have had first-hand knowledge 
(perception), or may have forgotten the details of the 
underlying event (memory).9 
The hearsay rule and its exceptions, viewed 
together, represent a balancing between the hearsay 
dangers and the search for the truth. 10 While the 
general rule prohibits hearsay evidence because its 
reliability cannot be tested by cross-examination, the 
exceptions recognize that statements made under some 
circumstances, as well as certain types of documents, 
are probably nonetheless reliable. I I In essence, the 
exceptions provide a circumstantial shortcut to reli-
ability, bypassing cross-examination.12 This idea is 
central when brought into the realm of formal admin-
istrative adjudications,13 where the fact that evidence 
is hearsay is not determinative. 14 Instead, evidence is 
admitted based on "its probative value, reliability and 
the fairness of its use." 15 
B. Administrative Practice 
Despite the apparent similarities, formal adminis-
trative adjudications l6 are institutionally distinct from 
federal court trials. 17 The rationale for establishing 
other commentators consider sincerity and narration as separate 
concerns. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory com-
mittee's note ("Sometimes a fourth is added, sincerity, but in fact 
it seems merely to be an aspect of the three already mentioned."). 
8MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 245. 
9/d. 
IOJames L. Rose, Hearsay in Administrative Agency Adjudica-
tions, 6 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 459, 459 (1992). 
li/d. 
'2/d. 
'3/d. at 460. 
'4Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980). 
I sId. 
'6As defined by the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.c. § 
554 (1994). 
17Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in 
Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE LJ. 1,4-6 (1971). 
These distinctions include the expertise of the AU and that the 
27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 10 
rules of evidence is altered by these distinctions. 18 
The principal difference is that the ALl is the trier of 
fact. 19 While the rules of evidence in a jury trial serve 
to insulate jurors from unreliable evidence, the rules 
"promote fairness" to the parties in an administrative 
setting.20 Fairness intersects with reliability, however, 
in the decision to admit or exclude hearsay evidence.21 
Formal administrative proceedings are governed 
by the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA").22 The 
AP A provides the minimum procedural rules which 
agencies must follow. 23 An agency may expand these 
rules to suit its specific needs sua sponte,24 but review-
ing courts may not impose additional procedural 
requirements on the agency Y 
The AP A rules of evidence, which are used in the 
majority of federal administrative proceedings,26 
provide for liberal admission of evidence, including 
hearsay.27 Specifically, the APA states: 
Any oral or documentary evidence may be 
received, but the agency as a matter of 
policy shall provide for the exclusion of 
irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious 
evidence. A sanction may not be imposed 
AU is always the trier of fact, the policy-making function of 
administrative agencies, and the efficiency demands of the 
administrative process. Id. But see Michael H. Graham, Ap-
plication of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency 
Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 353, 353 (1991) (arguing they are equivalent to 
federal civil non-jury trials "in all significant respects"). 
'8Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 5. 
19/d.; see also Rose, supra note 10, at 462. 
20 Rose, supra note 10, at 462. 
211d. at 464 ("Reliability is the critical consideration, and the 
threshold issue is whether the proffered evidence is probably 
reliable."). But see Davis, supra note I, at 689 ("The guide [for 
admission] ought to be the probative effect of the evidence."). 
225 U.S.c. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 
( 1994). 
23/d. §§ 554, 556 to 557. 
24Rose, supra note 10, at 470. 
2SVermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978). 
26Graham, supra note 17, at 369. 
27!d. at 355. 
or rule or order issued except on 
consideration of the whole record or those 
parts thereof cited by a party and supported 
by and in accordance with reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence.28 
In other words, a proceeding is fair when evidence is 
freely admitted, provided that final decisions of the 
ALJ are based only on evidence deemed "reliable, 
probative and substantial."29 The usefulness of this 
standard as applied to proffered hearsay evidence 
poses the central problem at hand. 
C. Federal Rules of Evidence Residual Hearsay 
Exceptions 
The Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") are 
generally inapplicable to the administrative process.30 
The foundational requirements of two hearsay rule 
exceptions, however, can provide part of a useable 
standard for evaluating hearsay evidence in adminis-
trative proceedings.3! Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) are 
the "catch-all" or "residual" hearsay exceptions. They 
are identical, except that in the case of the former, the 
availability of the declarant is immaterial, while in the 
latter, the declarant must be unavailable.32 
The residual exceptions provide that hearsay, 
inadmissible under any other hearsay exception, "but 
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness,'>33 is admissible under the following 
conditions: (l) the evidence relates to a material fact; 
(2) the evidence is more probative than other evidence 
reasonably available on the same point; and (3) 
admission is in the interests of justice and the goals of 
the evidence rules.34 Advance notice to the adverse 
party of the proponent's intent to offer the evidence is 
285 U.S.c. § 556(d) (1994). 
29/d. 
30Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980). 
31/d. 
32See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) advisory committee's note. 
33FED. R. EVID. 803(24). 
341d. 
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also required.35 These foundational requirements are 
consistent with the general view on admission of 
hearsay in administrative practice.36 The rules rely on 
case law development with respect to what properly 
may be considered "equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees 0 f trustworthiness. "37 
D. Case Law Circumstantial Guarantees of 
Trustworthiness 
Numerous cases have examined the question of 
what may constitute circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness. The following review is not exhaus-
tive. A sampling is sufficient for the purposes of this 
article, since the focus is on primary hearsay dangers, 
as will be explained in Part IV. 
In Ohio v. Roberts,38 the United States Supreme 
Court established a two-part test to determine whether 
hearsay could meet the stringent requirements of the 
Confrontation Clause.39 The dual requirements set 
forth by Roberts were the unavailability of the declar-
ant and particularized guarantees oftrustworthiness.4o 
Ten years later in Idaho v. Wright,4! the Court added 
that the guarantees of trustworthiness should be shown 
from the totality of the circumstances, specifically 
"those that surround the making of the statement and 
that render the declarant particularly worthy of 
belief."42 The Court was divided on whether the use 
of corroborating evidence satisfied this requirement. 
The majority ruled that corroborating evidence could 
not be used to "support a finding that the statement 
351d. 
36Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980); see also 
Nat Stern, The Substantial Evidence Rule in Administrative 
Proceedings: Restrictions on the Use of Hearsay Since 
Richardson v. Perales, 36 ARK L. REV. 102, 121 (1982). 
37FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note. 
38448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
39U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him .... "). 
4°448 U.S. at 66. 
41 497 U.S. 805 (\990). 
42/d. at 820. 
27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 11 
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bears 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. "'43 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
. and Justices White and Blackmun, dissented, arguing 
the use of corroborating evidence should be per-
mitted.44 "It is a matter of common sense for most 
people that one of the best ways to determine whether 
what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is 
corroborated by other evidence."45 
Circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are 
not limited to corroborating evidence. Richardson v. 
Perales,46 decided by the United States Supreme Court 
in 1971, is generally considered the leading opinion on 
determining hearsay reliability in administrative 
proceedings.47 Perales involved a Social Security 
disability claim dispute in which the claimant chal-
lenged, on hearsay grounds, written reports of examin-
ing physicians who did not testify and the testimony of 
one doctor who had not examined the claimant. The 
ALJ upheld the agency's denial of benefits, but was 
reversed by the district court.48 In reversing the Fifth 
Circuit, the Supreme Court listed nine factors to 
"assure underlying reliability and probative value."49 
Principal among those factors were: (1) the apparent 
independence and lack of bias on the part of the 
doctors; (2) the consistency of the reports; (3) the non-
adversarial nature of the social security system; and 
( 4) that the reports were based on standard and thor-
ough examinations.50 The Court also noted the admin-
istrative burden and expense oflive testimony.51 
Additional factors for finding trustworthiness are 
recognized by other courts. A commonly cited factor 
43/d at 822. 
44/d (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
4S/d at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
46402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
47Stern, supra note 36, at 105-06. 
48Perales v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 288 F. Supp. 
313 (W.O. Tex. 1968), ajJ'd sub nom. Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 
44 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389 (1971). 
49Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,402 (1971). 
sOld. at 402-06. 
slId. 
27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 12 
is the lack of contradiction. 52 Facial credibility of the 
evidence also can be considered, including whether 
documents are signed and sworn or anonymous. 53 
Routinely prepared documents are generally found to 
be reliable.54 The apparent credibility of the witness 
testifying to the hearsay has been considered. 55 
Perhaps even double hearsay may be deemed 
reliable. 56 
s2Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1980)(finding 
reliable affidavits entered into evidence without objection); 
School Bd. of Broward County v. Department of Health, Educ. 
& Welfare, 525 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding hearsay 
evidence of racial bias reliable where uncontradicted); 
Jacobowitz v. United States, 424 F.2d 555 (Ct. CI. 1970) (finding 
hearsay evidence unreliable when objected to and contradicted 
by direct evidence). 
53Calhoun, 626 F.2d 145 (holding reliable affidavits later 
disavowed); Martin-Mendoza v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Service, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. I 974)(finding sworn statement 
by alien unavailable to testify at deportation hearing reliable, 
although declarant later recanted); McKee v. United States, 500 
F.2d 525 (Ct. CI. 1974) (rejecting as unreliable a photograph 
caption identifying the land in dispute because the identifying 
party was unknown). 
54 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (finding routine 
medical reports reliable); Veg-Mix, Inc. v. United States Dep't 
of Agric., 832 F.2d 60 I (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding authentication 
of routine invoices not required to prove reliability). But see 
Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(ruling that ex parte medical reports were insufficient to 
overcome the statutory rebuttable presumption of disability due 
to pneumoconiosis from coal mine dust contained in the Black 
Lung Act, 30 U.S.c. § 92 I (c)(4) (1994)); Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
v. Clayton, 578 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding ex parte 
medical reports improperly admitted because the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 
(1994), preserves the right to cross-examine witnesses in 
disability proceedings). 
55Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(finding statements reliable where declarants were disinterested 
parties and their statements were consistent); Reil v. United 
States, 456 F.2d 777 (Ct. CI. 1972) (dismissing the testimony of 
a witness who made mUltiple inconsistent statements). 
56Stern, supra note 36, at 114 (suggesting double hearsay can 
"constitute substantial evidence if it carries sufficient assurances 
of probativeness and reliability"). But see Browne v. 
Richardson, 468 F.2d 1003, 1007 (1st Cir. 1972) (concluding 
that "none of the individual pieces of evidence are substantial 
evidence. Nor can we say that when these meager scraps are 
In summary, the three hearsay dangers, coupled 
with the inability to cross-examine, form the basis of 
all hearsay objections.57 But the goals and practices of 
the administrative process militate against excluding 
hearsay evidence if it is deemed reliable.58 Even in 
judicial proceedings, the residual exceptions allow a 
more general admission of hearsay. 59 Finally, case law 
does provide reasonable examples of circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness to guide an ALl's 
evaluation of hearsay evidence.6o 
III. CURRENT MODELS AND STANDARDS 
As a practical matter, only two basic stan-dards exist for the admission of hearsay in 
administrative adjudications: the AP A and the FRE. 
Each has its adherents and detractors. In addition, the 
United States Department of Labor has adopted a 
modified version of the FRE, which some argue 
should be applied across the federal administrative 
board.61 Finally, Professor Davis advocates admitting 
all hearsay, regardless of its perceived value.62 
A. The AP A Standard 
The AP A standard has two parts and, conse-
quently, two distinct lines of problems. The first part 
applies to admissibility of evidence, while the second 
part limits the evidence that may be relied upon by the 
ALl in making a ruling or order. 
Under the first part, hearsay is admissible pro-
vided it is relevant, material and not unduly repeti-
tious.63 While these terms are generally understood, 
gathered together the total pile may be called substantial"). 
57 See supra text accompanying notes 5-15. 
58See supra text accompanying notes 16-29. 
59See supra text accompanying notes 30-37. 
60See supra text accompanying notes 38-60. 
6lGraham, supra note 17, at 383-84; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 
39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,25 (1987). 
62Davis, supra note 1. 
635 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994). 
Articles 
the relatively free standard of admissibility has been 
criticized as too permissive.64 Moreover, remand is 
more likely for an ALl's failure to admit evidence, 
than for a failure to exclude particular testimony or 
documents.65 The likelihood of remand can pressure 
an ALl to admit evidence of little probative value, 
creating delay and an unduly inflated record.66 
Once admitted, hearsay evidence alone can be 
dispositive provided it is reliable, probative, and 
substantia1.67 While these terms are somewhat vague, 
the concept of reliability is distinct from probative 
value.68 Probative value relates to relevancy, while 
reliability relates to veracity.69 The terms, however, 
are sometimes used interchangeably.70 
Embracing both reliability and probative value is 
substantial evidence. It has been defined as "such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion."71 A substantial 
evidence standard is "less demanding than that of 
preponderance of the evidence, and the ALl's decision 
need not constitute the sole inference that can be 
drawn from the facts.'>72 
64See Graham, supra note 17, at 369-70; Rose, supra note 10, at 
476-77. 
65Graham, supra note 17, at 369-70 ("Generally there is no cause 
for remand for allowing evidence to be admitted in error."); 
Pierce, supra note 61, at 6-7 ("[I]t seems impossible for an 
agency action to be reversed on the basis that the agency 
erroneously admitted evidence."). 
66Graham, supra note 17, at 369-70. 
675 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994). 
68Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,407-08 (1971) (referring 
to "administrative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability 
and probative value"); see also Rose, supra note 10, at 468. 
69Rose, supra note 10, at 478; cf FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory 
committee's note ("Problems of relevancy call for an answer to 
the question whether an item of evidence ... possesses sufficient 
probative value .... "). 
7°See Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA 
L. REV. 331, 342 (1961) (discussing "a tendency to admit 
hearsay where there can be no serious doubt of the credibility of 
the extra-judicial declarant - i.e., where probative force is 
high"). 
71Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938). 
72Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, 977 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1992). 
27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 13 
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Hearsay alone may constitute substantial evi-
dence, although this was not always the case.73 In 
Consolidated Edison v. NLRB,74 the United States 
Supreme Court stated: "Mere uncorroborated hearsay 
or rumor does not constitute substantial evi·dence. "75 
Some thirty years later, the Court in Richardson v. 
Perales76 clarified that statement by saying that a 
"blanket rejection by the Court of administrative 
reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and 
probative value," was not the intended legacy of 
Consolidated Edison. 77 
The Perales Court also put to rest the "legal 
residuum" rule regarding reliance on hearsay in ad-
ministrative proceedings.78 The rule, first stated in 
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice CO.,19 allowed for 
admission of hearsay but provided "there must be a 
residuum of legal [non-hearsay] evidence to support 
the claim before an award can be made."80 Prior to the 
Perales rejection, the rule had been widely condemned 
as an illogical restriction on hearsay evidence.81 
B. Federal Rules of Evidence 
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) were 
adopted in 1975 for use by federal courts to "secure 
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable 
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and 
development of the law of evidence to the end that the 
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined. "82 The FRE provide for the exclusion of 
73Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402. 
74305 U.S. 197 (1938). 
751d. at 230. 
76402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
77/d. at 407-08. 
78Stern, supra note 36, at 112. Professor Stern notes, however, 
that some courts continue to rely on the rule's underlying 
premise. Id. at 114-15. 
79 113 N.E. 507 (N.Y. 1916). 
8°/d. at 509. 
81 Stern, supra note 36, at 113. 
82FED. R. EVID. 102. 
27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 14 
hearsay, subject to a number of exceptions. 83 
Ofthe 280 sets of regulations governing admis-
sibility of evidence in federal administrative adjudica-
tions, only thirty-seven mention the FRE.84 Where 
statutes or agency regulations make reference to the 
FRE standard, the standard is to be employed only "so 
far as practicable. "85 The vagueness of this qualifica-
tion on the FRE standard creates a great deal of 
uncertainty at the agency level and leaves reviewing 
courts with inconsistent application and direction.86 
Opponents to the use of the FRE hearsay rules in 
administrative proceedings have cited the lack of a 
jury as negating the necessity for protective eviden-
tiary rules.87 In fact, the Administrative Conference of 
the United States88 recommended against adopting the 
FRE to administrative practice, principally because of 
the hearsay rules. 89 
On the other hand, proponents of the FRE 
hearsay rules have argued that formal adjudications 
are quite similar to federal civil non-jury trials.90 
Indeed, the Supreme Court found that an ALJ 
performs a role "functionally comparable" to a trial 
judge.91 Nevertheless, the FRE still present problems 
of complexity and provide only a limited ability to 
8JFED. R. EVID. 802 to 805. 
84Pierce, supra note 61, at 5. But see Rose, supra note 10, at 461 
(estimating some 200 informal procedures within the federal 
system). 
85Graham, supra note 17, at 372. 
86/d. at 383; Pierce, supra note 61, at 7. 
87Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 5; Graham, supra note 17, at 360; 
Stern, supra note 36, at 103 ("Many, ifnot most, rules limiting 
the admission of evidence are designed not so much to aid the 
search for truth as to prevent consideration of certain types of 
relevant evidence by those thought incapable of assigning such 
evidence its proper weight."). 
885 U.S.C. §§ 593-596 (1994). Funding for the Conference was 
terminated by a House-Senate committee on September 13, 
1995. See William Funk, R.I.P. A.C. u.s., ADMIN. & REG. LAW 
NEWS, Winter 1996, at 1, 11. 
89Graham, supra note 17, at 359. The Conference's 1986 
recommendation is codified at I C.F.R. § 305.86-2 (1995). For 
a discussion of the recommendation, see Pierce, supra note 61. 
90/d. at 360. But see supra note 21. 
91Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,513 (1978). 
distinguish between reliable and unreliable hearsay.92 
C. The Department of Labor Modifications 
Rejecting the FRE "so far as practicable" 
scheme, as well as the AP A evidence rules, the United 
States Department of Labor ("DOL") developed its 
own set of evidence rules for formal hearings.93 The 
DOL adopted the FRE hearsay rules while adding 
exceptions relating to documents and written reports 
of experts to accommodate application in the adminis-
trative arena.94 
The DOL standard's permissive use of the FRE 
avoids the problems reviewing courts have with the 
"so far as practicable" application ofthe FRE.95 At the 
same time, an ALJ has the support of the FRE to 
expedite the administrative proceeding.96 The FRE are 
widely known and have a substantial body of case law 
interpretation, making rules predicated on the FRE 
familiar to the litigants.97 
D. Another View: Admit All 
Standing alone in many respects, Professor 
Kenneth C. Davis has long maintained the position 
that there should be no distinction drawn between 
hearsay and nonhearsay.98 Whether evidence is 
admitted or excluded, and the weight it is accorded, 
should be determined by its probative value.99 "[T]he 
guide should be a judgment about the reliability of 
particular evidence in a particular record in particular 
circumstances, not the technical hearsay rule with all 
nFED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note. 
9JGraham, supra note 17, at 373. The rules are codified at 29 
C.F.R. §§ 18.101 to 18.1104 (1995). 
941d. at 376-82. 
9lPierce, supra note 61, at 25. Reviewing courts have interpreted 
"so far as practicable" inconsistently. Id. at 16; Graham, supra 
note 17, at 383. 
96Pierce, supra note 61, at 25. 
971d. 
98Davis, supra note 1, at 689. 
99/d. 
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its complex exceptions."loo Professor Davis argues for 
the application of a reasonable person standard to 
determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a 
finding. lol This judgment, however, must take into 
consideration the record and the type of proceeding. 102 
Davis' approach is criticized on the bases of 
fairness and predictability. "Any free-wheeling, open 
admission of all proffered evidence 'for whatever it is 
worth,' regardless of reliability, is neither fair nor 
predictable. "103 
E. Summary 
Despite these apparent conflicts, the admission of 
reliable evidence and the exclusion of unreliable 
evidence remain the common goals. 104 Implicit in 
each of the foregoing standards is the tension between 
an efficient administrative process and fairness to the 
parties involved. 105 While the AP A standard provides 
the parties with a broad opportunity to support their 
cases, it does so at the risk of an inflated and unwieldy 
record. 106 The FRE promote fairness with a more 
predictable, albeit complex, set of rules, but in the 
process, the FRE's standards may exclude some 
reliable evidence.107 The DOL modifications ease 
some of those restrictions, but the complexity largely 
remains. 108 Professor Davis' thesis provides for 
simplicity, but simplicity comes at the expense of 
predictability. 109 
,oold. 
IO'/d. at 695 ("A finding may be supported by the kind of 
evidence on which reasonable people are accustomed to rely in 
serious affairs, whether or not the evidence would be admissible 
before a jury."). 
I021d. at 698. 
IOJRose, supra note 10, at 478. 
I04Rose, supra note 10, at 479 ("There is no real dispute that 
unreliable evidence ought to be excluded."). 
lOSe! Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 5-6. 
106See supra text accompanying notes 63-81. 
I07See supra text accompanying notes 82-92. 
108See supra text accompanying notes 93-97. 
I09See supra text accompanying notes 98-103. 
27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 15 
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
Perhaps the principal dispute underlying the hearsay issue is not how to judge reliability, 
but when. The AP A and Professor Davis favor 
admission followed by a reliability determination. 
The FRE standard requires a demonstration of proba-
ble reliability before admission. Each view is sup-
ported by substantial reasoning. It is possible to 
satisfy the requirements of each view through a 
synthesis of the foundational elements of the residual 
hearsay exceptions and the case law tests of circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The result is a 
two-part test designed to minimize the hearsay dangers 
and to satisfy the AP A requirements while remaining 
relatively simple to apply. 
This synthesis begins with the residual hearsay 
exceptions. 11O The rules allow hearsay to be admitted 
as substantive evidence provided: (1) it relates to a 
material fact; (2) it is more probative than other 
evidence reasonably available on the same point; and 
(3) admission of the evidence is in the interest of 
justice. I II The evidence must also embody circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to an 
identified hearsay exception. I 12 
The first part of the test is drawn from the 
elements of the residual exception: Hearsay is admis-
sible when it has probative value concerning a mate-
rial fact and is not obviously unreliable. 
To determine that hearsay evidence is not obvi-
ously unreliable, two requirements should be satisfied. 
First, the evidence cannot be "so internally inconsis-
tent or implausible on its face that a reasonable 
factfinder would not credit it. "113 This requirement 
IIOSee supra text accompanying notes 30-37. 
II lId. 
"2/d. The residual exception also requires advance notice. But 
this aspect of the rule is inapposite to the efficiency of the 
administrative process and is not a part of this proposal. 
113 Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985); 
United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1992) 
("We must accept the evidence unless it is contrary to the laws of 
nature ... or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no 
reasonable factfinder could accept it."); see also Reil v. United 
27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 16 
mirrors the clearly erroneous standard of review. I 14 
Second, the source of the evidence must be known. 
This requirement excludes mere rumor and documents 
of an unknown author or origin. 115 Support for this 
construction can be found in Irving Younger's pro-
posal to allow admission of hearsay provided the 
evidence reasonably could be accepted as trustworthy 
by the trier of fact as an initial question. I 16 
Thus, the first prong of the test satisfies rele-
vancy requirements fundamental to the AP A and FRE 
standards. 117 This preliminary test also quickly dis-
poses of clearly unreliable evidence. The second part 
of the test is drawn from the case law determinations 
of trustworthiness. While hearsay constitutes reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence when it meets the 
requirements for admissibility in the test's first part, 
the second part of the test guarantees the trust-
worthiness of the evidence in light ofthe three hearsay 
dangers, as explained below. 
Drawing from case law, the indicia of trustwor-
thiness are many. liS They include apparent independ-
ence of the declarant, lack of contradiction by direct 
evidence, lack of objection to admission, corrobora-
tion, and standard or routine practices or documents. I 19 
Creating a list for an ALl's reference merely mimics 
the often confusing FRE hearsay exceptions. Addi-
tionally, it is highly unlikely that such a list could be 
sufficiently comprehensive. 
Instead, an ALl should look directly to the three 
hearsay dangers - narration, perception, and memory 
- and view the evidence within the context of each 
States, 456 F.2d 777 (Ct. CI. 1972) (rejecting testimony 
involving multiple inconsistent statements). 
114Jd. 
liS Anderson v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 1198, 1203 (Ct. Int'I 
Trade 1992) (noting with approval AU's rejection of testimony 
referring to unnamed declarants); McKee v. United States, 500 
F.2d 525, 528 (Ct. CI. 1974) (excluding identifying photo cap-
tion where caption's writer was unknown). 
"6Irving Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 
S.C. L. REV. 281, 293 (1980). 
1175 U.S.c. § 556(d)(1994); FED. R. EVID. 402. 
118See supra text accompanying notes 38-60. 
119Jd. 
one. Is there a reason to believe the declarant was 
insincere or misunderstood? Did the declarant have 
first-hand knowledge? Do circumstances suggest the 
declarant's memory would weigh against the truthful-
ness of the evidence? In asking these questions, the 
ALl applies the same criteria justifying any recog-
nized hearsay objection. Accordingly, the ALl should 
be able to determine whether the evidence bears 
sufficient reliability to use fairly in reaching a 
decision. 
The second prong of the test minimizes the 
hearsay dangers by requiring a demonstration of 
reliability equivalent to the basis for a hearsay excep-
tion. It also satisfies the AP A requirements for 
substantive evidence in accord with the Perales 
opinion. 12O Finally, a circumstantial guarantee of 
trustworthiness satisfies the FRE residual hearsay 
exception requirement. 
Viewed as a whole, the test provides a relatively 
. simple application an ALl could employ to minimize 
the dangers of relying on hearsay, while satisfying due 
process and the AP A requirements. Since the test 
satisfies the FRE residual exception in all but the 
advance notice aspect, the test could be used by 
agencies required to follow the FRE either "so far as 
practicable" or with a change in agency rules to 
eliminate the advance notice requirement. 
This test should yield results consistent with 
current case law. For example, in Perales the hearsay 
evidence consisted of· medical reports from four 
examining doctors and the direct testimony of a fifth 
doctor whose testimony was based on other doctors' 
written reports - not a direct examination of 
Perales. 121 Applying this test's first prong, an ALl 
would find medical opinions regarding a claimant's 
physical condition probative of a material fact. Next, 
the ALl would determine that reports were from 
known sources and did not present evidence which 
was impossible to believe or internally inconsistent -
even though they were in conflict with the direct 
'2°Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
121Id. 
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testimony of Perales' personal physician. 122 The 
evidence, therefore, would be admissible after the first 
prong of the test. 
Applying the test's second prong, the ALl would 
look to the nature of the reports for indicia of 
trustworthiness in light of the three hearsay dangers. 
The ALl would find: (1) that narration posed no 
problem since the evidence consisted of written 
medical reports; (2) perception posed no problem as 
the doctors writing the reports had examined 
Perales; 123 and (3) since no evidence suggested the 
reports were written long after the examination, 
memory posed no problem. By allaying the three 
hearsay dangers, the evidence would be deemed 
reliable, probative, and substantial. Therefore, the 
evidence would satisfy the second prong of the test. 
Since both parts of the test were satisfied, the evidence 
could be used to support the ALl's decision, as was 
held by the Perales Court. 
A similar result occurred in Woolsey v. NTSB.124 
In that case, Woolsey objected to several documentary 
exhibits proffered by the government to prove that 
Woolsey's company was holding itself out to the 
public. 125 The evidence included published magazine 
ads, promotional materials, several facsimile transmis-
sions from persons known to the FAA investigator, 
and several bank checks from customers. 126 
Applying the two-prong test proposed by this 
article, the Woolsey evidence would have been admis-
sible. First, all of the evidence was probative of 
material facts. Second, none of the evidence was 
improbable. Third, all of the items came from identi-
fied sources. Thus, under the first part of the test, all 
the evidence would be admissible. Next, the evidence 
'22Id. at 402. 
12JThe fifth doctor did not examine Perales, but was subject to 
. cross-examination. 
124993 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming emergency revocation 
of a commercial pilot certificate), cert. denied, I 14 S. Ct. 1829 
(1994). 
'25Id. at 519. Woolsey's license was revoked for operating as a 
common carrier while following the less stringent safety rules 
applicable to private aircraft. Id. at 517. 
'26Id. at 519. 
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would be deemed trustworthy because none of the 
materials present serious concerns of narration, 
memory, or perception. 127 Consequently, the evidence 
propounded in Woolsey would constitute substantial 
evidence, as was found by the Fifth Circuit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Federal ALJ s need a simple, uniform standard to weigh hearsay evidence. This standard 
must comply with the specific requirements of the 
AP A. It must minimize hearsay dangers while pro-
moting the efficiency goals of the administrative pro-
cess. It must be fair. 
To construct such a standard, the foundational 
requirements of the FRE residual exceptions can be 
meshed with the circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness, as developed in recent case law. The 
result is a two-prong test capable of meeting the AP A 
and due process requirements while maintaining a 
high level of admissibility of hearsay evidence. 
Utilizing this test, the ALJ would first exclude 
evidence that is either irrelevant, immaterial or facially 
unreliable. If admissible, the ALJ would analyze the 
evidence with regard to the three hearsay dangers. If 
the evidence poses no significant hearsay concerns, it 
could be admitted and relied upon as substantial 
evidence. 
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I27While a "fax" may be garbled in transmission, Woolsey did not 
object to the accuracy of the documents, only to their hearsay 
nature. Id. 
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